Summary 2010 WY 38

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Lovato v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 38

Docket Number: S-09-0073

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts: Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to two drug-related charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.

Issues: Whether the trial court erred in finding that (1) there was "probable cause" to conduct a traffic stop of Appellant's car; and (2) the scope of the traffic stop was not exceeded by the trooper's actions.

Holdings: When district court's decision to deny a motion to suppress is reviewed, the appellate court will defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

In the present action, Appellant's initial contact with the trooper was an investigatory traffic stop, not an arrest. The distinction is significant because it takes less to justify a traffic stop than an arrest. Because of its limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" in order to justify the detention.

The trooper in the present action readily admitted that this stop was prompted by the information provided by the confidential informant that Appellant was carrying illegal drugs. The trooper believed that this information, by itself, was insufficient to justify a stop. However, an officer is permitted to make a traffic stop if he personally observes a traffic violation, without regard to his subjective intent. The trooper testified that he observed two traffic violations. Almost as soon as he spotted Appellant's car, he "could see the sunlight glinting off of a crack on the windshield on the upper left side of the windshield." This, the trooper testified, suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-5-955(a). A short time later, the trooper observed that he was unable to read the car's rear license plate number because of "a dark-tinted license plate cover on the rear license plate." This suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. 31-2-205(a)(i).

Appellant points out in that there were inconsistencies in the testimony about the location of the crack in the windshield and as to when the cracked window violation was added to the warning ticket issued Appellant for his traffic offenses. However, after considering conflicting evidence, the district court found the exact position of the windshield crack is immaterial in determining whether the trooper possessed the necessary level of suspicion to stop Appellant. The uncontroverted fact is that a windshield crack existed that was noticeable from both the interior and exterior of the vehicle. The finding of the district court is consistent with the trooper's testimony. Although Appellant's evidence to the contrary is sufficiently persuasive that the district court might reasonably have found in his favor, it did not, but that alone does not make the finding clearly erroneous.

Evidence about the license plate cover is also troublesome. According to the trooper, he could not read the license plate on the back of Appellant's car, but could read the one on the front "just fine." According to both Appellant and his wife, there were identical license plate covers on the front and the back of the car. In addition, the trooper described the license plate as "dark-tinted," and testified that the date sticker on the upper left corner of the license plate was "covered by the frame of the license plate protector." The actual license plate cover was accepted into evidence during the suppression hearing. It is the same translucent plastic material throughout, with no frame that could have blocked the trooper's view of the date sticker. While the plastic is not entirely transparent, it is a stretch to describe it as dark-tinted. The plastic is shiny, however, and it is conceivable that in some angles of sunlight, the combination of glare and tinting could make the license plate harder to read. The trooper did not mention the angle of the sunlight or any other such details, but he did testify unequivocally that the license plate cover obscured his view of the license plate on the rear of Appellant's car. The appellate court is not in a position to assess the credibility of this testimony, or to weigh it against the conflicting evidence. The district court was in that position. Based on its findings of fact, the district court concluded that the trooper possessed more than the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant because he personally observed Appellant driving in violation of two statutes. Having deferred to the district court's findings of fact, there was sufficient probable cause to provide the trooper with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Appellant. The initial stop was justified.

A traffic stop must be of reasonably short duration, and that there are limits to the questions that may be asked of the detained driver. An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the driver's proof of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation or warning. The officer may detain the driver and his vehicle only for the period of time reasonably necessary to complete these routine matters. Once the driver has produced a valid driver's license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must be allowed to proceed without further delay. During the stop, an officer generally may not ask the detained motorist questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop, including questions about controlled substances, unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of other illegal activities.

According to the dispatch records kept by the Wyoming Highway Patrol, the trooper initiated the traffic stop of Appellant at 11:01:23 a.m. and the canine unit arrived at the scene at 11:05:38, and reported by radio at 11:06:09 that the dog had alerted on Appellant's car. Appellant concedes that the drug detection dog's alert gave the troopers probable cause to detain him further, search his car, and subsequently search his person. Thus, the initial detention that Appellant challenges lasted only from the initiation of the traffic stop until the drug detection dog alerted, a total of four minutes and forty-six seconds. The limited amount of time that the trooper was in verbal contact with Appellant does not indicate that his initial detention was unreasonably prolonged. As to the subject matter of the questions, the trooper testified that he asked the driver several questions regarding his trip, as far as his origin - his origin and destination. Questions regarding travel plans are an acceptable area of inquiry during a traffic stop. There is no indication that the trooper used these questions to prolong Appellant's detention unreasonably. Appellant's detention was prolonged, and his car was searched, not because of his questioning by the trooper, but because the drug detecting dog alerted on his car. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the district court erred in concluding that the trooper's questioning of Appellant was reasonable.

The district court's denial of Appellant's suppression motion is affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

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