Summary 2010 WY 137

Summary of Decision issued October 21, 2010

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Case Name: In the Interest of DRT, A Minor, JET, v. The State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services

Citation: 2010 WY 137

Docket Number: S-10-0057

URL: http://tinyurl.com/2dn8xud

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Respondent): John M. Burman, Faculty Supervisor, and Joshua S. Toy, Student Intern, U.W. Legal Services Program, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Petitioner): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Jill E. Kucera, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sue Chatfield, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 21, 2010

Facts: This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect of her child, and from the disposition order placing the child in the custody of the Department of Family Services.

Issues: Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect because (1) the juvenile court failed to advise the appellant at the initial hearing that a termination of her parental rights may be initiated upon an adjudication of neglect; (2) the juvenile court accepted the admission of neglect notwithstanding the evidence that the appellant suffered from a mental illness; and (3) the juvenile court’s acceptance of the appellant’s admission of neglect sets a dangerous precedent that will deter persons in her position from seeking assistance from governmental agencies.

Holdings: A motion to withdraw an admission in juvenile court is similar to a motion to withdraw a plea in a criminal case, and thus the standard of review is as follows: (1) a parent does not have an absolute right to withdraw an admission of neglect in a juvenile proceeding; (2) the juvenile court is vested with discretion to determine whether to grant or to deny a motion to withdraw an admission; (3) the denial of such a motion is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court where the admission was voluntary and where the procedural requirements of the applicable statutes were met at the time the admission was accepted.

In the instant case, the child was taken into temporary protective custody without a court order. Wyo. Stat. 14-3-409(a) (2009) requires that, in such case, a petition in statutory form be filed and that an informal shelter care hearing be set as soon as possible. Wyo. Stat. 14-3-409(b) (2009) also directs the court to give certain advisements at that hearing. In addition to these advisements, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426(a) (2009) requires the juvenile court to give additional advisements at the initial hearing. The appellant does not contend that the juvenile court failed to give any of these advisements at the hearing. The appellant argues, however, that the juvenile court violated her right to the due process of law by failing to advise her, in addition, of the existence of other statutory bases for the possible termination of her parental rights.

The parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected interest with which the State may not interfere in the absence of procedural and substantive due process. However when a proceeding is held under a particular child protection act, there is no authority for the conclusion that the failure to give notice of the existence of other statutory bases for the possible termination of her parental rights violates due process. The neglect petition was brought pursuant to the Child Protection Act found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-3-401 et. seq. (2009). At a hearing, the State has the burden of proving an allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. When a child has been adjudged to be neglected under the Act, the juvenile court is obligated to ensure that reasonable efforts were made by the department of family services to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child’s home or to make it possible for the child to return to the child’s home. The Child Protection Act then also provides that, if a child has been placed in foster care under the Act for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the state shall file a petition to terminate parental rights. It is notice of this potential for termination of parental rights that is required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409(b)(vi). The juvenile court is not obligated to advise the parent of the potential filing of a termination petition under a different legislative act. The hearing transcript shows that the juvenile court in this case carefully advised the appellant of her rights in these proceedings, and of the consequences that could result from an admission or a finding of neglect. That is as far as the juvenile court was required to go. Consequently, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect on the basis of the advisements given at the initial hearing.

A diagnosis of a recognized mental illness does not automatically render a person incompetent to enter a guilty plea. Two things are readily apparent: the juvenile court’s meticulous recitation of the appellant’s rights and the nature of the hearing, and the juvenile court’s careful investigation of the appellant’s mental capacity. Other than the appellant’s self-identified prior diagnoses, there is nothing within the transcript of that hearing that suggests any inability on her part to understand fully what was being said. It is also telling that, at the hearing upon the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission, the appellant, now represented by counsel, presented no evidence, and almost no argument suggesting mental incapacity. Her argument consisted largely of this single sentence: “It is also troubling that she mentioned she had a bipolar disorder and it was of enough concern that a psychiatric evaluation was also ordered.” Perhaps even more telling is the fact that the evaluation had taken place prior to the hearing, with the report indicating that, although she did indeed suffer from bipolar disorder and a “mixed personality disorder,” the appellant showed no evidence of disorganized thought processes, did not suffer from ADHD, and had a “high average intellectual functioning.” In short, there is absolutely nothing in the record suggesting that the due process of law required that the appellant be allowed to withdraw her admission of neglect based upon her mental condition, because there is nothing in the record suggesting that her mental condition had any effect upon the voluntariness of that admission.

The question as to whether the juvenile court abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect because acceptance of the admission sets a dangerous precedent that will deter persons in her position from seeking assistance from governmental agencies was not considered because it was not supported by cogent argument, because it is not supported by citation to relevant authority, because it is based upon policy considerations more properly brought before a legislative body, and because it is entirely speculative. Moreover, implementation of such a policy would render application of the Child Protection Act impossible where the neglect is made known to authorities by voluntary action of a parent. Once the appellant sought assistance, there was little choice but to take the child into protective custody. And once that occurred, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-409 required that a petition be filed and that a shelter care hearing be set, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-426 required an initial hearing on the petition. Short of immediately returning the child to the appellant, an option the appellant did not even seek, the only appropriate procedure was to obtain an admission or denial from the appellant.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw her admission of neglect. The appellant’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, the admission was voluntary, and the juvenile court followed all appropriate procedures at the hearing. Affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.