Summary 2011 WY 11

Summary of Decision January 24, 2011

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Case Name: Leavitt v. State

Docket Number: S-10-0116

URL: http://tinyurl.com/68fyahn

Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County, Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Matthew E. Riehl, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program.


Date of Decision: January 24, 2011

Facts: After being convicted of four misdemeanors and felony interference with a peace officer, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to support the felony interference.

Issues: Whether there was sufficient evidence to show “specific intent” and convict Appellant of felony interference with a peace officer for driving his vehicle directly at a deputy during a high speed chase.



Holdings: The State may prove specific intent by the permissible means of inference from circumstantial evidence. One inference is that someone who knowingly drives an automobile directly at another person can reasonably be found to have intended to do bodily injury to that person. In the present action, various officers testified as to Appellant’s actions during the chase which forced them to take evasive actions to avoid collisions as well as to the actions they observed which resulted in the charge in question.
Taking these accounts into consideration, the testimony provides circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could draw an inference regarding Appellant’s general mental state during the night of his arrest. The question is not whether other inferences would be possible. Rather, the question is whether a rational jury could draw this particular inference without entertaining a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the inferred fact. A jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented in this action the existence of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to cause bodily injury.

Affirmed.


J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.