Summary 2011 WY 143

Summary of Decision October 14, 2011


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Case Name: Craft v. State

Citation: 2011 WY 142

Docket Number: S-11-0039

URL: http://www.blogger.com/goog_1422358376

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Gregory A. Phillips, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jeremiah I. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: October 14, 2011

Facts: Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A). He reserved the right to appeal whether he entered a valid waiver of counsel in a prior conviction that was used to enhance the present charge to a felony. Appellant contends his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because he did not act with a “full awareness” of his right to counsel and did not “understand the consequences” of his waiver. Appellant additionally contends that advisements concerning possible defenses to the crime and mitigating circumstances are necessary in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver. He also suggests that the Saratoga municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him.

Issues: Whether Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he pled guilty in a municipal court proceeding so as to allow that conviction to be used to enhance a later charge to a felony pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 35-7-1031(c)(i) (2009).

Holdings: In deciding whether a defendant has entered a valid waiver of counsel, it must first be determined whether the defendant’s waiver was voluntary. If the waiver was voluntary, then it must be determined whether the defendant waived the right knowingly and intelligently

In the present action Appellant concedes that his waiver of counsel was “voluntary.” He argues, however, that his waiver was not “knowing and intelligent” because he did not act with a “full awareness” of his right to counsel and did not “understand the consequences” of his waiver. Appellant contends that advisements concerning possible defenses to the crime and mitigating circumstances are necessary in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver. He also suggests that the municipal court was required to advise him of the potential consequence that his conviction could be used to enhance future charges against him.

Appellant has presented no Wyoming precedent, requiring that a defendant be advised of possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, or the possibility that a conviction can be used for future sentence enhancement prior to entering a valid waiver of counsel. Rather, Wyoming authority indicates that such advisements are not required. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) sets forth the advisements that must be given to an unrepresented defendant before acceptance of a guilty plea. W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not mention possible defenses or mitigating circumstances. Further, a defendant does not need to be advised of the possibility of future sentence enhancement prior to the entry of a valid guilty plea. A trial court’s duty to insure that a defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters one extends only to direct consequences of such a plea.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court, in Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) has stated that constitutional requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” In light of this Supreme Court precedent, and the relevant Wyoming authority, the court was persuaded by Appellant’s argument that his waiver of counsel was invalid because he was not advised of possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, or the possibility that his conviction could be used for future sentence enhancement. A defendant does not need to be given such advisements in order to effect a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.

Appellant also claims that his waiver of counsel was inadequate. However, Appellant was advised of his right to counsel, was specifically asked whether he wished to proceed with an attorney, twice stated that he did not wish to be represented by counsel, and did not dispute the waiver of counsel until presenting a collateral challenge in this appeal. Appellant does not claim that he did not fully understand the nature of the charge against him or the range of allowable punishment for the crime prior to entering his plea. Nor does Appellant assert that he was unaware of his right to counsel. The record shows that, at the time of the municipal conviction, Appellant was an adult and possessed a high school equivalent education. Further, the record provides no indication that Appellant had any kind of language difficulties or lack of verbal comprehension.

Thus, the advisements given in the municipal court proceeding complied with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11, and there is no indication in the record that Appellant did not understand those advisements, including the advisement that he had a right to an attorney. Consequently, Appellant’s assertion that he did not wish to be represented by counsel must be taken at face value. The district court did not err in finding that Appellant’s waiver of counsel in the municipal proceeding was knowing and intelligent.

Affirmed.





J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.