Summary 2007 WY 30

Summary of Decision issued February 21, 2007

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Case Name: Cornelius v. Powder River Energy Corp., Inc.

Citation: 2007 WY 30

Docket Number: 06-186

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): C. John Cotton of Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming; and Kenneth E. Barker of Barker Reynolds Law Firm, LLC, Belle Fourche, South Dakota. Argument by Messrs. Cotton and Barker.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Bruce A. Salzburg of Freudenthal, Salzburg & Bonds, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Issues: Whether the district court erred in failing to determine whether the contract between Baldwin and PRECorp was written or oral. Whether the district court erred in applying the wrong standard to determine whether Baldwin was an independent contractor. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Baldwin was an independent contractor. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to PRECorp’s liability for its own negligence.

Facts/Discussion: Cornelius sued his employer (Baldwin) and the company for which Baldwin did contract work (PRECorp) for injuries suffered when he contacted a live electrical line. The district court granted summary judgment to PRECorp on two grounds: first, as the employer of an independent contractor, PRECorp was not vicariously liable for injuries to that contractor’s employer; and second, PRECorp was not independently liable.
Standard of Review: Summary judgments are governed by W.R.C.P. 56. The Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo without giving any deference to the district court’s determinations.
Whether the Contract was Written or Oral: The Court’s review of the district court decision letter found the parties had entered into written contracts annually with an attached then-current fee schedule. The district court’s facts and conclusions were based upon that contract and the Court found no error in that regard.
Whether Baldwin was an Independent Contractor: The answer to this question was dependent upon the answer to the first question because the district court looked at cases where there was an express written contract between the parties, rather than to cases where there was not. The Court reviewed the district court decision letter and noted their reliance on Franks v. Independent Production Company, Diamond B. Servs. v. Rohde, Hille v. Pacific Power & Light Co., Jones v. Chevron and Hjelle v. Mid-State Consultants, Inc. When that law was applied to the facts of the instant case, it was clear Baldwin was an independent contractor and that summary judgment in favor of PRECorp was appropriate. PRECorp did not retain anything approaching a “controlling or pervasive role” in the work. Their role was to specify where the work was to be done and to pay for the work that was done. The flaw with Cornelius’ argument was that it directly contravenes the basic premise that an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries suffered by that independent contractor’s employee.
Whether Baldwin was an Independent Contractor: The Court reviewed the entire record, and in particular the depositions in the file. The Court was convinced that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Baldwin was an independent contractor.
PRECorp’s Liability for its own Negligence: PRECorp had no affirmative duty toward Cornelius that it breached. There was no allegation that PRECorp’s premises were unsafe. PRECorp did not control the method and manner of work performed by Baldwin, and PRECorp did not voluntarily assume any safety duties. Cornelius’s injuries were caused by his own lack of care, and/or by Baldwin’s failure to provide safe equipment.

Holding: There were no genuine issues of material fact to contradict the conclusion that PRECorp was not vicariously liable for the acts of its independent contractor, Baldwin, and that PRECorp violated no separate legal duty owed by it to Cornelius.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yqdr5x .