Summary 2009 WY 45

Summary of Decision issued March 31, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Cramer v. Powder River Coal, LLC

Citation: 2009 WY 45

Docket Number: S-08-0049

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge.

Representing Appellant Cramer: C. John Cotton, Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee Powder River Coal: Billie Addleman and Richard Mincer, Hirst Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Facts/Discussion: Cramer brought suit against the owner and the operator of Caballo Mine, seeking to hold them liable for damages he suffered in an accident that occurred while he was working at the mine site as an employee of Weld Test Inspection & Service. The Caballo Mine is a large surface coal mine located in the Powder River Basin and is owned and operated by two affiliated companies, Powder River Coal, and Caballo Coal known as “PRC”.

Release: PRC requires visitors to the mine to sign their Release. Cramer as a contractor was considered a visitor and was required to sign it. Throughout pretrial proceedings, the parties sharply disputed the meaning and significance of the Release. Their disagreements were raised before the district court numerous times in the context of discovery disputes and motion hearings. As a result, the district court issued several different rulings and decisions regarding the Release.
Limiting discovery concerning PRC’s financial status: The district court granted protective orders to PRC regarding discovery requests for financial information related to Cramer’s punitive damages claim. The parties referred to Campen v. Stone where the Court adopted an approach and procedure for the discovery and presentation of evidence of the financial status of a defendant when punitive damages are sought. The Court reviewed the record and noted the list of facts asserted by Cramer were sufficient only to support a claim of ordinary negligence.
Exclusion of the Release from evidence: The Release was a statement made by PRC that could tend to make it more likely that PRC had breached its duty of taking reasonable precautions to protect visitors from foreseeable hazards. However, not all relevant evidence is admissible. The district court excluded the Release on the basis that it was potentially misleading or confusing to the jury.
Limiting discovery regarding the Release: For the most part, Cramer did not specify which discovery request that PRC should have been required to answer, nor does he suggest how discovering that information might have helped his case.
Claim for “damages for violation of duties imposed by contract”: Cramer pleaded a cause of action alleging that PRC’s conduct violated duties imposed by federal coal leases. He also presented evidence concerning certain MSHA regulations and instructed the jury that regulatory violations could be used as evidence in support of his negligence claim. The three cases Cramer cited, Downtown Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, Becker v. Mason and Natrona County v. Blake did not support his contention that PRC’s alleged breach of contract provided him with a basis for pursuing a separate tort claim against PRC apart from the negligence claims he pursued at trial.
Expert testimony regarding whether PRC violated applicable regulations: The record established that the district court allowed all of the expert testimony offered by Cramer dealing with the regulations and the standard of care. When a statute or regulation establishes the applicable standard of care with reasonable clarity, expert testimony as to that standard and its breach are unnecessary. It was not unreasonable for the district court to determine that the expert opinion testimony in this instance was unnecessary and not helpful to the jury.
Response to jury question: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to remain consistent with its prior ruling that the expert’s opinion was not admissible because it was not helpful to the jury.
Applying collateral estoppels to claims involving cervical injuries: The Division allowed the claims for the injuries to Cramer’s foot and knee but denied the claim for neck injuries on the basis that he failed to prove that it was caused by or related to his workplace accident. In his suit against PRC, Cramer included claims for damages relating to his neck injury. Because the jury found that PRC was not liable for any of Cramer’s damages, any issue relating solely to damages was moot.

Conclusion: The Court agreed with the district court that Cramer failed to make a prima facie showing of a viable punitive damages claim. Given the district court’s conclusion that the Release was only marginally relevant, it was not unreasonable for it to exclude it from evidence. Expert opinion testimony is unnecessary when a statute or regulation establishes the applicable standard with reasonable clarity.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ctst2q .

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