Summary 2005 WY 148

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Case Name: Taylor v. State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division

Citation: 2005 WY 148

Docket Number: 05-14

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): P. M. "Mike" Roberts, Erickson & Roberts, Rawlins, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renniesen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandon W. Snyder, Special Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: November 22, 2005

Issues: Whether the hearing examiner's decision to deny workers' compensation benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.

Holdings:
In order to be eligible to receive worker's compensation benefits, a claimant must have sustained an "injury" which is defined by Wyo. Stat. 27-14-102(a)(xi) as, "any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging . . . arising out of and in the course of employment while at work . . . ." In order to prove that her injury occurred in the course of employment, Petitioner must establish a causal connection between her work-related incident and her current complaints. Whether a causal connection exists is a question of fact.

With respect to medical testimony, a standard of reasonable medical certainty with respect to such causal connection will not be invoked. Testimony by the medical expert to the effect that the injury 'most likely,' 'contributed to,' or 'probably' is the product of the workplace will suffice. However, a hearing examiner is entitled to disregard an expert opinion if he finds the opinion unreasonable, not adequately supported by the facts upon which the opinion is based, or based upon an incomplete and inaccurate medical history provided by the claimant. It is the obligation of the trier of fact to sort through and weigh the differences in evidence and testimony, including that obtained from medical experts. The task of determining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence is assigned to the trier of fact, and its determination will be overturned only if it is clearly contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Where the testimony of a disinterested witness is not directly contradicted but there are circumstances which controvert the testimony or explain it away, or if such testimony is clouded with uncertainty and improbability, or otherwise appears to be unreliable or unworthy of belief, the trier of fact is not bound to accept it. Justice does not require a court or jury to accept as an absolute verity any statement of a witness merely because it is not directly or specifically contradicted by other testimony, and there are many things which may properly be considered in determining the weight that should be given the direct testimony of a witness even though no adverse verbal testimony is adduced. If such testimony is evasive, equivocal, confused, or otherwise uncertain, it may be disregarded. In the present action, there is testimony in the record from a physician's assistant that the Petitioner's current problems "probably do relate to that initial injury on the 2nd of March 2002." However, since this testimony could properly be construed as equivocal and based upon an inadequate medical history, the hearing examiner was not required to accept it. Additionally, Petitioner's discharge from physical therapy in July 2002 and her admission that she was pain free for several months thereafter further support the finding that her initial injury had resolved by July 2002. Thus, substantial evidence exists to support the findings of the hearing examiner that Petitioner failed to establish a causal connection between her current medical problems and the 2002 work injury.

The decision of the OAH is affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court