Summary 2005 WY 152

Summary of Decision issued November 29, 2005

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Case Name: DeLoge v. State

Citation: 2005 WY 152

Docket Number: 04-85, 04-129

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Steven A. DeLoge, Pro se.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Lucas E. Buckley, Student Intern.

Date of Decision: November 29, 2005

Issues: 04-85 Whether the district court erred when it declined to rule upon Appellant's motion for the preservation and return of seized property.

04-129: Whether the district court erred when it denied Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without affording him an evidentiary hearing.

Holdings: Case 04-85

Both W.R.Crim.P. 41(e) and Wyo. Stat. 7-2-105 make it plain that Appellant may seek to have his property restored to him, absent some justification provided by the State for its continued retention. However, Appellant filed a notice of appeal before the district court had an opportunity to decide his motion for return on its merits. Whether the district court intended to simply ignore the motion, or to rule on it eventually, is not revealed by the record. Appellant's appeal was premised on the notion that his motion had been deemed denied by operation of W.R.Civ.P. 6(c) since W.R.Crim.P. 1(a) invokes the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure on procedures where the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure are silent. However, the Court declined to import the "deemed denied" rule into criminal proceedings where a district court is required either by the tenor of the governing rules, or the precepts of due process, to timely dispose of motions filed by criminal defendants. For this reason, Appellant's appeal is dismissed and the matter is remanded to the district court with directions that it rule in a timely manner on the merits of Appellant's motion for the return of his property.

Case 04-129

W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that if a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made after sentencing, a plea "may be set aside only to correct manifest injustice." "Manifest injustice" contemplates a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party. It is, in part, intended to address a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. The party seeking to withdraw his pleas bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice. Justification for this heightened standard for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing is based in the practical considerations important to the proper administration of justice. Before sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution
resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared with the public interest in protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. The result would be to undermine respect for the courts and fritter away the time and painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing process. A district court has discretion in determining whether a party has proved manifest injustice. Absent an abuse of that discretion, the district court's determination will not be disturbed. In the present action, Appellant's motion did not set out facts or circumstances that constituted a manifest injustice. Therefore, the district court's denial of the motion is affirmed on the basis that the district court's only proper course of action was to deny the motion as failing the "manifest injustice" test.

Although not explicitly raised as an issue in these appeals, it should be noted that Appellant has exhausted his state remedies in this criminal matter by means of his direct appeal and two petitions for post conviction relief. Although the district court is required to consider Appellant's motion for the return of his property, it may decline to consider any additional matters relating to this criminal case. Any further pleadings filed by Appellant in the district court relating to
this criminal matter may be summarily dismissed or denied by the district court.

The appeal in Case No. 04-85 is dismissed, and that matter is remanded to district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The appeal in Case No. 04-129 is affirmed.

C.J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.