Summary 2005 WY 165

Summary of Decision issued December 29, 2005

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Case Name: State v. McAuliffe

Citation: 2005 WY 165

Docket Number: 04-65

Petition for Writ of Review/Certiorari

Representing Petitioner: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Rehurek.

Representing Respondent: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Thomas L. Lee, Special Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Mr. Lee.

Date of Decision: December 29, 2005

Issues: Whether the district court erred in holding that Jones v. State, does not permit searches of the person, vehicle or residence for drugs as a condition of probation for convicted drug defendants.

Holdings: The Court does not interfere with a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress unless the findings are clearly erroneous. The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is, however, a question of law that is reviewed de novo. The district court found that Respondent’s arrest was unlawful and suppressed the drug evidence discovered incident to that arrest. The legality of this particular search depends on whether the probation condition requiring Respondent to submit to random searches was permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court reviewed the affirmance in Pena which was on the sole ground of consent, and stated that the discussion of the “reasonableness requirement” was dictum. The Court decided that Nixon offered no guidance in the resolution of the issue at hand because the officers had reasonable cause for a second search based on their observations of the residence during the first search that Nixon consented to and that was a part of his probation conditions. Next the Court commented that Jones went beyond the reach of Nixon and Pena because it concerned random searches. The Fourth Amendment analyses in Jones, Knights, and ACC can be applied to the facts of this case. The circuit court’s probation order, with the attendant reasonable search conditions, authorized the detectives as part of their duties to question Respondent about his probation status and to conduct a random search for drugs on his person and in his vehicle; that the detectives were lawfully performing their official duties when they contacted Respondent at the scene of the traffic stop and questioned him; and that Respondent’s statement to the detectives that he was not consenting to the random search, as well as his false statement to the detectives that he was not on probation, gave the detectives probable cause to arrest him for knowingly obstructing, impeding or interfering with peace officers while engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties.

The order of the district court granting Respondent’s motion to suppress is reversed and the matter remanded.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

J. Voigt specially concurred with J. Kite joining: J. Voigt agreed with the majority that the district court’s order must be reversed and he agreed with the Jones rationale, but was not convinced that Respondent’s statement that he was not on probation and that he did not consent to the search constituted interference with a peace officer because the statements did not hinder the officers’ pursuit of their duties.

District Judge Stebner, retired, dissented: Judge Stebner disagreed with the conclusions drawn from Knights. He concluded that although probable cause is not required, some quantum of individualized suspicion is necessary. He agreed with J. Voigt that Respondent’s conduct did not constitute interference but he felt that the officers would not have found the drugs on his person because they did not have a warrant or probable cause. The officers were relying on the probation condition which required Respondent to consent to the search. When Respondent refused to consent, the officers should have initiated the process for revoking probation as provided by W.R.Cr.P. 39.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/aeymk .