Summary 2006 WY 9

Summary of Decision issued January 17, 2006

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Case Name: Kennedy Oil v. Lance Oil & Gas Co.

Citation: 2006 WY 9

Docket Number: 05-95

Appeal from the District Court of Johnson County, Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

Representing Appellants: Morris R. Massey of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, Wyoming; and Timothy J. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, PC of Buffalo, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees: Patrick R. Day, PC, and James R. Belcher, PC, of Holland & Hart, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: January 17, 2006

Issues: Whether Appellants are estopped from denying Appellees’ title. With the resolution of that issue, it will be unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the parties.

Holdings: The parties identified ten interrelated issues and arguments for appellate review, with the primary issue being the district court’s application of the relation or “relation-back” doctrine. The Court contrasted the doctrines of relation and estoppel by deed and discussed the recording act. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellees on the basis of the doctrine of relation. The standard of review of summary judgment is de novo, and the Court will uphold a summary judgment based on any proper legal theory appearing in the record.
The doctrine of relation: “When it becomes necessary in furtherance of justice, a transfer of title that is the result of several steps or transactions is held to take effect by relation from the first substantive act.” The doctrine of relation has also been adapted to and applied to the problem of establishing a water right from permit application to actual appropriation. The same reasoning has been applied to amended court pleadings in W.R.C.P. 15(c) and is incorporated into W.R.C.P. 3(b). In the instant case, the district court concluded that the doctrine of relation “as set forth in Walliker” controlled the outcome, so the Court addressed that case in detail. Walliker was a quiet title action brought by the successors in interest. Its logic, if limited to that circumstance, cannot be imported into the instant case where issues have nothing to do with “proving up” ownership to government land. The Court considered another aspect of Walliker that more nearly equated the present facts. The Court considered the effect of the “quitclaim” language and the effect of quitclaiming only a fractional mineral interest. The common element in all of the applications of the relation doctrine is the establishment of a right or interest through multiple steps. The central precept is that legal title obtained via patent relates back to equitable title obtained via entry, thereby giving effect to conveyances such as mineral leases occurring during the interim. In the instant case, there are no issues of entry or patent. The Court therefore concluded that the relation-back doctrine as used in Walliker was not applicable to the facts of this case.
The Court next turned to estoppel by deed/after acquired title because they felt that a similar result was dictated by application of those doctrines. The general principle is that a grantor and his privies are estopped as against the grantee and those in privity with him to assert anything in derogation of the grant or from denying the truth of any material facts stated in the conveyance. A conveyance may give rise to estoppel by deed when it contains language showing that the grantor intended to convey and the grantee expected to acquire a particular estate. The nature of a conveyance is determined by the intent of the parties. In Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-2-104 and 34-2-105, the bar to conveyance of after-acquired title via quitclaim deed is specifically limited to those quitclaim deeds that appear in the statutory form. The leases at issue do not resemble the statutory quitclaim deeds and so the statutes do not apply to bar application of the related doctrines of estoppel by deed and after-acquired title. Therefore, Appellants are estopped from denying the title Appellee’s obtained and they are estopped from raising their after-acquired title in derogation of Appellees’ interests.
The Court declined to further consider the Recording Act in the instant case because to do so would violate the fundamental principle of the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Since Appellants could not assert their after-acquired title, there are no conflicting documents upon which the recording act can operate.

The district court's judgment is affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to case: http://tinyurl.com/98fgr .