Summary 2006 WY 59

Summary of Decision issued May 12, 2006

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Case Name: Phillips v. Toner.

Citation: 2006 WY 59

Docket Number: 05-77

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County, the Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge, Retired.

Representing Appellant: C.M. Aron, of Aron & Hennig, LLP, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Raymond B. Hunkins and Amanda Hunkins Newton, of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, Wyoming.

Date of Decision: May 12, 2006

Issue: Whether Dr. Phillips’ claims are barred by collateral estoppel.

Holding: Appellant was hired by Jack Grynberg to provide services as a consulting economist in a Colorado lawsuit. Appellant’s bill for services of $52, 896.00 was disputed. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Mr. Grynberg. Mr. Toner is a Wyoming attorney who represented Mr. Grynberg in the Colorado litigation. Appellant sued Appellee for payment of the $52,896.00. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the district court finding there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation og previously litigated issues and involves an analysis of four factors: (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with theissue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. To determine whether collateral estoppel applies, the Court compared the prior adjudication with the present action. The only apparent difference in both lawsuits related to the named defendant. The Court disagreed that this distinction was critical. Appellant had a fair and full opportunity to litigate all issues regarding the terms of the agreement for which he performed services and whether he was paid for those services in Philips I.
Appellant’s fraud claim received specific comment from the Court. Actions sounding in fraud must be pled with particularity and proved by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Appellant did not allege fraud with particularity nor did he meet his burden of demonstrating genuine issues of material fact by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence. Summary judgment on the fraud claim was proper even if not barred by collateral estoppel.

The Court affirmed the district court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/foqj6 .