Summary 2006 WY 64

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Case Name: Sanchez v. State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division

Citation: 2006 WY 64

Docket Number: 05-204

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Petitioner): Michael H. Schilling of Schilling & Winn, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Respondent): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: May 26, 2006

Issues: Whether the Medical Commission's finding that Appellant's symptoms were not causally related to her employment was supported by substantial evidence. Whether the Medical Commission's actions were arbitrary and capricious.

Holdings: When an injury arises over time, a Appellant's burden of proof is enhanced by Wyo. Stat. 27-14-603(a) (2005). Although the statute specifically enumerates five elements which need to be established, they are closely related because each contributes to indicate whether the employment environment caused the injury. Therefore, the same evidence will often offer support to several of the elements. The test is whether a Appellant has shown a causal connection between the injury and the employment. In the present action, two experts testified at the contested case hearing as to the casual connection between Appellant's injury and her employment. When faced with deciding between the conclusions of two medical experts, the fact-finder must consider: (1) the opinion given; (2) the reasons for the opinion; (3) the strength of the opinion; and (4) the qualifications and credibility of the individual giving it. The Medical Commission determined that one expert's conclusion could not be relied upon because he had not inquired sufficiently into the Appellant's job duties, the frequency of heavy lifting, or into her non-work-related leisure activities that could have caused her symptoms. In contrast, the testimony of the other physician expert based his opinion on a review of the Appellant's entire medical file and he determined that her symptoms did not appear to be work-related. While the Commission could have come to other conclusions based on the evidence presented, the appropriate standard of review requires acceptance of the Commission's conclusions if they are supported by substantial evidence. In this case, it appears that a reasonable mind could accept the conclusions of one expert over the other and, therefore, the Commission's findings are affirmed..

There are a variety of ways in which an agency's actions can be arbitrary and capricious. An exclusive list of arbitrary and capricious actions has never been created. However, the Appellant has not attempted to analogize the actions of the Commission or the Division to any previous case law, and has further failed to demonstrate how the absence of "legislation, rules, and regulations" specifically dealing with her condition is otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Because the Appellant's argument is not supported by citation to pertinent authority and merely references her closing argument, but not factual evidence contained in the record, it must fail.

The Commission's conclusion that the Appellant's injury was not causally related to her employment is supported by substantial evidence. Further, the Appellant has not demonstrated that the Commission's decision was otherwise arbitrary and capricious.

Affirmed.

J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.