Case Name: Dettloff v. State
Citation: 2007 WY 29
URL:
http://tinyurl.com/38gwolDocket Number: 05-217
Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.
Date of Decision: February 16, 2007
Issues: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence found in the automobile Appellant was driving. Whether defense counsel was ineffective in representing Appellant with regard to the motion to suppress evidence. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant's convictions. Whether a jury instruction as to the term "possession" allowed Appellant to be convicted on the basis of two alternatives where there was not enough evidence to support both alternatives. Whether the trial court erred in admission of uncharged misconduct evidence.
Holdings: A defendant may challenge a search as being unconstitutional only if he can demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched. The defendant must show "both an actual subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize." There are four factors that courts consider to determine whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched: (1) the precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of the drafters of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the property rights a claimant possesses in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of the individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or seized. In claiming that he had standing to challenge the vehicle search, Appellant points to evidence showing the owner of the vehicle, asked Appellant's companions and Appellant to go to a storage unit and retrieve the automobile. However, he points to no evidence showing the owner gave him permission to drive the vehicle. One of the companions was also licensed to drive a motor vehicle, the three-some drove to the storage unit in Appellant's automobile and no evidence was presented as to how or why Appellant ended up driving the stored vehicle. The district court's conclusion that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the search was correct. Appellant failed to carry his burden of proving that he was legitimately present in the vehicle.
An appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that: 1) counsel's performance was deficient and 2) prejudice resulted. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. To warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on the appellant. The appellant must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats an ineffectiveness claim. An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice. When ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged due to counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, prejudice to a defendant can only be shown where, had the motion been made, it would have been granted, and had the evidence been suppressed, only a limited amount of evidence remained to support a conviction. In the present action, the district court correctly ruled Appellant did not have standing to challenge the vehicle search, and that conclusion applies to the constitutionality of the search under both the state and United States constitutions. Because Appellant did not have standing, he cannot show that presentation of an adequate state constitutional claim would have resulted in suppression of the evidence. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court accepts as true the State's evidence and affords it those inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. Conflicting evidence or inferences that can be drawn from such evidence will not be considered. The determination is whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Applying these standards, the evidence the State presented in the present action, and inferences that may be drawn from it, are reviewed to determine whether a reasonable jury could have concluded the State proved the charges against Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. After a careful review of the record, there is no doubt the evidence the State presented met that standard. From the evidence the State presented, a reasonable inference can be made that Appellant was under the influence of methamphetamine when he was arrested and had used and possessed marijuana prior to his arrest the same day. A reasonable inference also can be made that the methamphetamine, marijuana, oxycodone and drug paraphernalia found in the pencil case in the automobile under the seat in which Appellant had been sitting was his. Additionally, a reasonable inference can be made from the quantities of methamphetamine, the paraphernalia and the amount of cash Appellant was carrying that he possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it to others. Thus, sufficient evidence was presented from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offenses charged.
When a crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each alternative. However, the instruction Appellant calls into question merely defined the word possession. Pursuant to the instruction, possession could be "actual" or "constructive." Either would suffice to constitute possession. The use of the terms "actual" and "constructive" did not "have the effect of charging an alternative ground for conviction."
Where a defendant files a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), the same shall be treated as the making of a timely objection to the introduction of such evidence. The State must then justify the evidence as proper under one of the exceptions to character evidence articulated in W.R.E. 404(b) or the general expansion of that rule and demonstrate that the evidence is relevant for the proposed purpose. Thus, a defendant is not required to object to uncharged misconduct evidence at trial if he has filed a pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence. The rationale for this rule is that rulings on uncharged misconduct evidence are too important to be made in the heat and pressure of a trial, with the jury twiddling its thumbs in the next room. In the present action, Appellant filed a demand for notice of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence. The State responded with notice of its intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence but the notice did not identify the evidence Appellant now claims was improperly admitted under the rule. The question here is whether the challenged evidence actually was uncharged misconduct evidence falling within the confines of Rule 404(b). The problem with Appellant's claim is that the State did not present the challenged testimony as "evidence of other crimes" under Rule 404(b). Rather, the State used the testimony to raise the inference that the marijuana Appellant possessed earlier in the day was the same marijuana found in the automobile later in the day. The testimony was not evidence of uncharged misconduct and the principles governing Rule 404(b) evidence do not apply.
Affirmed.
J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.
