Summary 2007 WY 58

Summary of Decision issued April 11, 2007

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Case Name: Stewart v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Safety and Compensation Division

Citation: 2007 WY 58

Docket Number: 06-154

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Employee/Petitioner): David M. Gosar, Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Objector/Respondent): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Kristi M. Radosevich, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: April 11, 2007

Issues: Whether the Office of Administrative Hearings erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the Appellant's use of medications prescribed to his wife to help treat his pain following surgery for a work-related hernia - medication that when added to the prescription pain medication he had been given caused anoxic brain injury - disqualified him from worker's compensation for the brain injury. Whether the essential finding that Appellant's expert witness' opinion was "speculative" was not supported by substantial evidence and/or arbitrary and capricious.

Facts/Discussion: A claimant is entitled to receive additional worker's compensation benefits if an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention. To be eligible for benefits, the original compensable injury must be the direct cause of the subsequent injury. The claimant bears the burden of proving the causal connection between the subsequent injury and the course of his employment. In this case, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing examiner's decision that his brain injury was not the direct and natural result of the initial compensable injury. The Appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that the original injury was the direct cause of his subsequent anoxic brain injury because the intentional ingestion of his wife's pain medication broke the causal chain. Appellant did not follow his physician's orders, did not call his physician to report his problems with pain, or seek less drastic alternatives for problems he was having after his minor hernia procedure. He did not take his wife's narcotic pain medication by accident or mistake. He demanded that she give him her prescribed medication. A subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is not compensable unless it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury. Appellant's intentional conduct was an independent intervening cause of the subsequent brain injury.

The agency, as the trier of fact, has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the evidence and the witnesses. On appeal, the agency's decisions regarding witness credibility will not be second-guessed. The record will be reviewed to determine whether substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's decision. In this case, conflicting evidence was presented to the hearing examiner at the administrative hearing. As the finder of fact, the hearing examiner is charged with resolving conflicting testimony. The hearing examiner afforded little weight to Appellant's expert's opinion, describing the testimony as speculative and irrelevant. Speculative medical testimony is insufficient to satisfy a claimant's burden of proof.

Holding: Substantial evidence existed in the record to support the hearing examiner's decision that the brain injury was not the direct and natural result of the initial compensable injury and that Appellant had failed to establish arbitrary or capricious administrative action.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the opinion for the court.

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