Summary 2007 WY 66

Summary of Decision issued April 26, 2007

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Case Name: Strandlien v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 66

Docket Number: 05-8

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, the Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Nathan A. Preuss, Student Intern, State Public Defender Program. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.

Issues: Whether the length of time between the traffic collision, the initial DWUI charge and the subsequent Aggravated Homicide by Vehicle charge and conviction deny Strandlien’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial. Whether the destruction of the blood sample prohibited Strandlien from being able to refute testimony about how much he had to drink which may have affected whether the jury believed his drinking was the proximate cause of death. Whether Strandlien was unconstitutionally prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when (A) Mr. Roybal failed to communicate a plea offer and (B) Mr. Murray failed to present available defenses that were likely to change the outcome of the trial. Whether the cumulative effect of these errors prevented Strandlien from receiving a fair and just trial. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an expert to refute the State’s theory of the case.

Facts/Discussion: Appellant sought review of his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide under § 6-2-106(b)(i). He contended that he was denied a speedy trial and that defense counsel rendered constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to consult with a pertinent expert witness.
Speedy Trial: Even though Strandlien did not allege a speedy trial violation below, the Court addressed the issue because it implicated a constitutional right. The Court determines whether a speedy trial violation has occurred by use of the Barker test which requires the balancing of four factors. Under existing case law, the speedy trial period begins to run upon the filing of a criminal complaint or the arrest of the defendant, whichever occurs first. When one charge is replaced by another, the constitutional speedy trial clock is not affected. The Court reviewed the timing of the instant case and stated the length of delay was presumptively prejudicial and further analyzed the remaining factors. The Court reviewed the reasons for the delay and noted that some occurred with Strandlien’s consent and some were a result of his actions. The record was such the Court could not weigh the delay in favor of or against either party. Strandlien failed to assert his right to a speedy trial at any time during the criminal proceedings which weighed heavily against the claim. Finally, the Court considered the degree of prejudice that Strandlien suffered as a result of the delay. Strandlien had the burden of proving actual prejudice. He did not identify or address with any particularity the pretrial anxiety he allegedly suffered, so the Court gave the claim no consideration. Strandlien also asserted prejudice from the destruction of his blood sample before he had an opportunity to have it independently tested. However, he provided no facts to support his speculation that further testing would have yielded a lower BAC. The Court held there was no violation of Strandlien’s right to a speedy trial.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: While waiting to hear the appeal, the Court remanded the case to district court for a hearing on whether Strandlien was denied effective assistance of counsel. The district court determined that trial counsel rendered effective assistance. The Court defers to the district court findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and reviews the conclusions of law de novo.
The Court reviewed the record and decided that due to the contradictory opinions of how the accident occurred, defense counsel should have consulted with an independent accident reconstruction expert. This failure constituted deficient performance. The Court then considered whether the deficient performance prejudiced Strandlien. A careful review of the transcript convinced the Court that had the expert testified at trial, it was reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
The Court’s conclusion that the case must be reversed because of the trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to consult an accident reconstruction expert made it unnecessary to address Strandlien’s other claims.

Holding: The Court held that Strandlien’s right to a speedy trial was not violated under the facts of the case. However, they found that trial counsel’s assistance was constitutionally deficient and therefore they reversed the conviction. The case was remanded to the district court.

Reversed and remanded.

J. Golden delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/ysuhyv .