Summary 2009 WY 31

Summary of Decision issued March 6, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Taylor v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 31

Docket Number: S-08-0158

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, and Charles F. Pelkey, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance Program.

Facts: Appellant appeals his conviction on numerous criminal charges, including first-degree murder, on the ground that the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain uncharged misconduct evidence.

Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior uncharged instances in which the appellant threatened someone.

Holdings: While uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible to prove or disprove consequential facts such as intent, knowledge, motive, preparation, or plan, it is not admissible to show that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes. A four-part test has been adopted for testing the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence: (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the uncharged misconduct evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.
As to the first question—whether the evidence was offered for a proper purpose—in the present action, the district court agreed with the State that the evidence was properly offered to prove motive and intent, especially as those concepts helped to establish the element of malice. The district court concluded that evidence of the three prior instances was probative, in particular, of the concept of jealousy as motive. For all intents and purposes, the only question facing the jury in this case was whether the appellant acted in a sudden heat of passion, or acted with malice. It was appropriate for the State in these circumstances to produce evidence of motive and intent. Thus, it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion in determining that all three instances of prior misconduct were being offered for a proper purpose.
The second question a trial court must answer in deciding whether to admit uncharged misconduct evidence is whether the evidence is relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. This question is usually answered, at least in part, by an affirmative response to the first question. It should nearly go without saying that any proper purpose for admission of the evidence is a purpose that is relevant. In the foregoing discussion, for instance, if intent and malice were not relevant, they would not be proper purposes for admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence. The district court correctly concluded that the uncharged misconduct evidence was relevant in this case because it went to the heart of the matter—in effect, it tended to rebut the appellant’s “heat of passion” argument. Stated in terms of the rule, the evidence made it less likely that the appellant acted suddenly and without malice, motivated only by the “heat of passion.”
The third question to be asked in a trial court’s determination of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. In determining the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court should consider the following factors: 1.How clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad act? 2. Does the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad acts evidence? 3. Is other evidence available? 4. Is the evidence unnecessarily cumulative? 5. How much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad act?
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. In balancing against its probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the central question whether the defendant committed the charged crime. The trial court should weigh these additional factors against the probative value of the evidence: 1. The reprehensible nature of the prior bad act. The more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act. 2. The sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act. Again, the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act if the victim was especially vulnerable. 3. The similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act. The more similar the acts, the greater is the likelihood that the jury will draw the improper inference that if the defendant did it once, he probably did it again. 4. The comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad act. When the prior act is a more serious offense than the charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place the defendant in a different and unfavorable light. 5. The comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden inferences. Evidence of the prior bad act may be much more probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate inference permitted by Rule 404(b). 6. Whether the prior act resulted in a conviction. The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he escaped punishment for the prior bad act.
The record reveals that in the present action the district court scrupulously complied with the guidelines, devoting a separate section of its decision letter to each of the four general issues, and discussing, in turn, each of the eleven factors directed specifically to balancing probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the appellant contends that the district court erred in the following particulars and thus abused its discretion: (1) the district court’s conclusion that the prior acts were sufficiently similar to the charged act to be probative of the appellant’s reaction to jealousy and conflict; (2) the district court’s conclusion that the prior acts were sufficiently dissimilar to the charged act, in that the appellant maintained some level of self-control in the former, that the jury would not be swayed toward making the improper inference of bad character; and (3) the district court’s conclusion that, because the prior acts were less serious than the charged act, the jury would likewise not be inclined to draw that same improper inference. In short, the appellant argues that the uncharged misconduct evidence was probative of nothing more than bad character, and should not have been admitted.
An abuse of discretion is not proven by a showing that a different decision could have been made. The findings of the district court should not be second guessed, especially where those findings are based upon a thorough review of the proffered testimony and a detailed application of the appropriate law. The existence of W.R.E. 404(b) presupposes that some uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible. In the instant case, taking cognizance of the nature of the charges and the nature of the uncharged misconduct evidence, the district court determined that evidence of two prior acts was offered for a proper purpose—to prove motive and intent as those concepts relate to malice—that it was relevant because it tended to make the existence of those consequential facts more likely than not, and that it was more probative than unfairly prejudicial because it met the proper standard. There was no abuse of discretion in the process or in the conclusions.
For the sake of completeness, the fourth element of the mandatory four-part test for the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence will be mentioned: whether a limiting instruction was given, if requested. The district court’s order admitting the evidence stated that “a limiting instruction is appropriate in the case and [the court] will consider any limiting instruction submitted by the Defendant.” No limiting instruction was located in the record, and the parties have not indicated that one was ever offered or given. Consequently, the fourth factor is inapplicable.

Conclusion: The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of two of three incidents of uncharged misconduct proffered by the State. The evidence was offered for a proper purpose, it was relevant, and its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Affirmed.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/d46fq6

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

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