Monday, January 11, 2010

Summary 2010 WY 3

Summary of Decision issued January 11, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Shelest v. State, ex rel., Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Compensation Div.

Citation: 2010 WY 3

Docket Number: S-09-0026

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, the Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge.

Representing Appellant Shelest: Donna D. Domonkos, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; John William Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: Shelest was injured in a motorcycle accident that occurred on his return trip to Evanston from a training program held in Rock Springs. At the time, he was an employee of WYDOT and he was attending a required program.
The Court has explained that there must be a causal nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment. An injury sustained by an employee while commuting to and from work is generally not compensable but an injury sustained during a trip taken as part of his work and for which he is reimbursed, is generally compensable. When an employee is on a work-related trip for which he is reimbursed but takes a side trip, he is no longer acting within the scope of his employment and is therefore not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits if an injury should occur.
Shelest insisted that a journey becomes a side trip or deviation only if there is an identifiable, concrete, personal errand to be accomplished. The Court stated that enjoying the scenery and weather may not be a specific, identifiable errand but it was sufficiently personal in nature to support the finding that Shelest was acting outside the scope if his employment while traveling the alternate route. The Court noted that the difference in distance between the alternate route and the direct route should be considered when determining whether a route is an alternate. In the instant case, the route was 50 miles longer and took approximately an hour longer than the direct route.

Conclusion: It is not necessary to identify a specific personal errand as the purpose of a deviation. The purpose identified by Shelest was purely personal. When pursuing that personal purpose, Shelest was acting outside the scope of his employment. Because the findings were not inconsistent the decision could not be considered arbitrary or capricious.

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

J. Hill dissenting joined by J. Kite: The Justices dissented because they felt the majority opinion applied an incorrect standard of review and that the more enlightened authorities on point held that merely using a longer alternative route to reach a location while traveling either to or from a work location absent any personal errand, the entitlement to receive workers’ compensation benefits is not affected.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yfw4brc .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

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