Summary 2010 WY 6

Summary of Decision issued January 19, 2010

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Baker v. State

Citation: 2010 WY 6

Docket Number: S-08-0094

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge.

Representing Appellant Baker: Diane M. Lozano. State Public Defender, Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee State: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General, Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General, D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

Facts/Discussion: A jury convicted Baker of one count of possessing controlled substance precursors with intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation associated with that crime, three counts of conspiracy, and two counts of child endangerment. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of six to eight years on the first four counts and concurrent terms of eighteen to twenty-four months on the child endangerment charges. The terms were to be served consecutively.

Denial of motion to suppress – consent: Baker argued the warrantless entry into his home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution because he did not consent to the search. The facts known to the officers at the time of the search support the conclusion that the live-in girlfriend, Merck, had the authority to consent to a search of the residence. Merck reported a domestic disturbance from her home at the hands of her live-in boyfriend. She expected Baker to not answer the door and told officers that they could go inside the home. She unlocked the door with her own key from her personal keychain.
Denial of motion for judgment of acquittal – child endangerment: Baker claimed the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the two counts of child endangerment because the State failed to prove the children were present at the time of the manufacturing activities. Through various witnesses the State established that for several months during 2006 Baker conspired with various individuals to operate a clandestine meth lab. Merck unequivocally admitted to the criminal activity taking place in her home over the course of basically a year. There was ample evidence presented to allow the jury to convict Baker of two counts of endangering children.
Jury instructions – child endangerment: Baker asserted the district court failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding the elements of child endangerment. The instruction tracked almost exactly to the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions. In addition the instruction mirrored the language of the statute. Baker showed the alleged error was clearly on the record but could not show where a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.
Jury instructions – conspiracy: Baker argued that the district court instructed the jury under the wrong conspiracy statute and thus, his convictions should have been reversed. Baker argued on appeal that the proper conspiracy statute to be applied was § 6-1-303 but the one his defense counsel insisted upon was § 35-7-1042. Baker’s charged conduct of conspiring to possess precursors and lab equipment or supplies is not delineated as a crime under the conspiracy provision of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv). Baker was convicted of crimes that do not legally exist. Lacking a legal basis, those convictions must be reversed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: Baker argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because of his trial attorney’s insistence that § 35-7-1042 was the correct conspiracy statute. Strickland requires that to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant in such a manner as to deprive him of a fair trial. The Court concluded that Baker’s trial counsel was ineffective. However, neither of the conspiracy statutes proposed by the State and the defendant was applicable to the instant case. Thus although counsel’s performance may have been deficient, the Court could not conclude that absent that deficiency, the result of the proceedings would have been altogether different.
Merger: Finally, Baker contended that Counts II, III, and IV (the conspiracy counts) should have merged for the purposes of charging and sentencing. The Court stated that since Baker’s charged conduct was not delineated as a crime under the conspiracy provision of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv) the charges and convictions were reversed.

Conclusion: The evidence seized during the warrantless search of Baker’s home should not have been suppressed as his live-in girlfriend’s consent was valid. Furthermore, Baker’s two convictions for child endangerment stand, and the court’s instructions on those charges were appropriate. The Court reversed Baker’s convictions on Counts III and IV because the incorrect conspiracy statute was applied. Because of that, Baker’s trial counsel was deficient, though he did not suffer any prejudice.

Affirmed in part and remanded in part.

J. Hill delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yzsqb64 .

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