Summary 2006 WY 31

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Case Name: Stanton v. State

Citation: 2006 WY 31

Docket Number: 05-87

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County, Honorable Nicholas Kalokathis, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Assistant Attorney General.

Date of Decision: March 20, 2006

Issues: Whether the district court erred when it denied Appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on a charge of bribery based on the grounds that there was no evidence he was a public servant performing a government function. Whether Wyo. Stat. 6-5-102(a)(ii) and 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) are unconstitutionally vague, either on their face or as applied to appellant.

Holdings: Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-5-101(a)(vi) clearly and unambiguously provides that the term "public servant" means, in addition to officers and employees of government, "any person participating . . . in performing a governmental function." The term "governmental function" is defined in subsection (ii) of the same provision as including "any activity which a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of the government." At the time he obtained the "persuasion money," Appellant was "a person participating" in an "activity which [he was] legally authorized to undertake on behalf of the government." Appellant, was an employee of a youth and family counseling agency and diversion services provider for youth involved in the juvenile justice system and was participating in the court ordered treatment of a juvenile resulting from his involvement in the juvenile justice system. Thus, under Wyoming statutes Appellant was a public servant performing a governmental function at the time he solicited and accepted the money. The definition of "governmental function," rather than "government" is the more appropriate focus for resolving the question of when a person is a public servant. The broad language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) clearly indicates that when any person participates in performing an activity which he is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of the government, such as court-ordered treatment for a juvenile involved in the juvenile justice system, he is acting as a public servant, even though his immediate employer may be a private company who contracts with the state. The intent of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a) clearly was to proscribe "any person," who is performing an activity he or she is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of a government, from using that authority for pecuniary benefit or personal advantage. Appellant's actions in attempting to use for personal financial gain his involvement in court-ordered treatment provided by the juvenile justice system by leading a juvenile's mother to believe that things would go easier for her son if she paid him the money falls squarely within the scope of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a).

Courts do not ordinarily permit a party whose particular conduct is adequately described by a criminal statute to challenge the statute on the grounds it does not provide adequate warning concerning other conduct that might fall within its ambit. It is only where a statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct or specifies no standard of conduct at all that such challenges will be considered. Since Appellant does not argue that the bribery statute reaches any constitutionally protected conduct, his challenge will be considered only if the statute specifies no standard of conduct at all. The bribery statute being challenged adequately specifies the standard of conduct it proscribes. Wyo. Stat. 6-5-102(a) clearly specifies that the offense of bribery is committed when a public servant solicits, accepts or agrees to accept pecuniary benefit or personal advantage upon an agreement or understanding that his action as a public servant will be influenced thereby. The standard of conduct proscribed is the agreement or acceptance that the public servant's actions will be influenced by the promises of pecuniary benefit or personal advantage. The definition of public servant contained in the preceding provision provides adequate notice that any person participating in a legally authorized act on behalf of a government is subject to penalty for violating the statute. The statute is not so vague as to specify no standard of conduct at all. The statute clearly and unambiguously makes it illegal for any person participating in performing any activity which he is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of a government to solicit, accept or agree to accept pecuniary gain or personal advantage based upon an agreement or understanding that his actions will be influenced thereby. The statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that Appellant's conduct in soliciting and accepting money in exchange for making things easier on a juvenile was illegal.

As in all criminal cases, the jury impaneled to decide Appellant's case was instructed on the law necessary to support a conviction for bribery. Thus, the jury was instructed verbatim on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii), the elements of bribery, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi), the definitions of the terms "public servant" and "governmental function" found in the bribery statute. It was then the jury's task, as it is in all criminal cases, to apply the evidence presented to the instructions on the law to determine whether the State met its burden of proving each of the elements necessary to support a conviction. While it is always the case that one jury might reach a different result than another on the basis of the same evidence and instructions, that fact does not demonstrate arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement in the sense required for finding a statute unconstitutional as applied. There is simply nothing in the facts presented here supporting a finding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-5-102(a)(ii) and 6-5-101(a)(ii) and (vi) were unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the opinion for the court.