Summary 2007 WY 122

Summary of Decision issued August 2, 2007

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Case Name: Craig v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 122

Docket Number: 06-30

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, the Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, and Edward K. Britzius, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program

Date of Decision: August 2, 2007

Issues: Whether Appellant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury when the district court made the factual determination that Appellant’s two previous convictions were assaults on household members. Whether Appellant entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.

Facts/Discussion: The procedure utilized to accept a guilty plea is examined as a whole to determine if the trial court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea. These procedural requirements are intended to assure that the defendant is not misled into an unintentional waiver of substantial rights. A guilty plea will stand where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant made a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty from alternative courses of action available to him and understood the consequences of his plea. In the present action, Appellant contends he was never adequately advised of the minimum and maximum penalties for his crime and, as a consequence, did not know whether he was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor or felony. The charging Information, however, was quite clear. Appellant pled guilty to felony battery against a household member. The unusual aspect of this case, and seemingly what Appellant is objecting to on appeal, is that a process was adopted whereby the State would present evidence at the sentencing hearing establishing that this was Appellant’s third battery conviction against a household member. In the event the State was unable to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the felony charge would be reduced to a misdemeanor. Appellant’s objection is not well-taken, however, since he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to this process. The charge against him was clear. The district court explained to Appellant several times the ramifications should he enter a guilty plea. Each time, Appellant acknowledged his understanding of what the district court was telling him. Thus, Appellant intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty with full awareness of the possible consequences.
The right to a jury trial, as critical and fundamental as it is, can be waived. In the present action, Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury determination of the facts underlying his prior assault and battery convictions. During a change of plea hearing, Appellant was expressly informed of his right to a jury trial. Early in the change of plea proceeding, the district court recommended that Appellant persist in his plea of not guilty and take the case to trial. Appellant, through counsel, declined. Later, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11, the district court properly advised Appellant of his right to a jury trial. Most pointedly, the district court plainly advised Appellant that, at sentencing, it would be receiving evidence and making the ultimate determination as to whether his prior convictions were against household members. Appellant indicated his understanding and agreement to this process. Reading the change of plea hearing transcript as a whole, it is shown that Appellant was given multiple opportunities to exercise his right to a jury trial. In the end, Appellant affirmatively agreed to bypass the jury and let the judge be the fact-finder.

Holdings: There was no ambiguity with the charge to which Appellant pled guilty. The district court very thoroughly explained Appellant’s rights and the process ultimately followed in determining his guilt and sentence. Appellant expressly agreed to the process employed, after affirmatively acknowledging his understanding of the same. Appellant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and the sentencing procedure was conducted in accordance with the parties’ agreement.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3ey5js .