Thursday, August 23, 2007

Summary 2007 WY 136

Summary of Decision issued August 23, 2007

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses "Universal Citation" and was given an "official" citation when issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. You will note that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you need to provide a pinpoint citation, the universal portion of the citation will use that paragraph number. The pinpoint citation in the P.3d portion should include the reporter page number. If you need assistance, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.

Case Name: Leyva v. State

Citation: 2007 WY 136

Docket Number: 06-233

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County, the Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Pauling.

Issues: Whether the district court improperly withdrew its acceptance of Leyva’s guilty plea. Whether the district court erred in allowing evidence of uncharged misconduct to be admitted at trial.

Facts/Discussion: Leyva appealed his conviction on two felony counts, one for burglary and one for third offense illegal possession of a controlled substance.
Standard of Review:
In reviewing a district court’s decision to accept or reject a guilty plea, the Court generally applies an abuse of discretion standard. However, in analogous cases involving sentencing under a plea agreement, the Court has applied the plain error standard when the defendant did not enter any objection. A trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.
Did the district court improperly withdraw its acceptance of Leyva’s guilty plea:
Leyva relied on two cases, United States v. Ritsema and Brewer v. Starcher. Those cases hold that after a guilty plea is accepted and the sentence pronounced, the trial court may not withdraw its acceptance or increase its sentence. In both cases, the trial court was acting unilaterally and over the objections of the defendants. In the instant case, the district court asked Leyva if he wished to withdraw his plea and Leyva said yes, and the district court allowed him to withdraw his plea. The district court’s actions were consistent with Wyoming’s rules of criminal procedure. W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides the district court the authority to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if made before a sentence is imposed. Because the Court concluded the district court’s decision did not violate any clear and unequivocal rule of law, it was not necessary for them to consider whether Leyva had established material prejudice. They noted that after the district court allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, he was given another chance to change his plea. Also, the district court gave him the same sentence he would have received under the terms of the plea agreement.
Did the district court err in allowing evidence of uncharged misconduct to be admitted at trial:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible if it serves a proper purpose, and is excluded only if its sole purpose is to prove that a defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. Intrinsic evidence (“part and parcel” of the crimes charged) is subject to W.R.E. 404(b). The district court’s misstatement that the evidence was not subject to W.R.E. 404(b) was rendered immaterial when the court immediately proceeded to analyze the evidence. The district court expressly found the evidence was relevant and that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The record reflected the district court considered the required criteria, had legitimate bases for its conclusions, and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence at trial.
Leyva further challenged the district court’s ruling on procedural grounds. The Court has adopted a procedure to be followed when uncharged misconduct evidence is to be introduced at trial. The State’s response to Leyva’s pretrial demand for notice of intent to introduce evidence was that it did not intend to introduce any evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b). The State maintained the position on appeal and the district court agreed with it. The State listed the evidence in its pretrial memorandum. Leyva made no claim that the evidence was inadmissible until trial was underway. At that point, the district court dismissed the jury and conducted a hearing on uncharged misconduct evidence. When the district court ruled the evidence was admissible, it did not list every conceivable purpose for admissibility. The record contained sufficient information to explain and support the trial court’s conclusions, and to allow meaningful review.

Holding: The district court did not err in granting Leyva’s request to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting uncharged misconduct evidence. Rather the district court properly analyzed the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), had a legitimate basis for admitting the evidence and under the circumstances, fulfilled the mandatory requirements for admitting evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).

Affirmed.

J. Burke delivered the decision.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/3xnmrb .

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