Summary 2006 WY 151

Summary of Decision issued December 15, 2006

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Case Name: Hatton and Hatton v. Energy Electric Co.

Citation: 2006 WY 151

Docket Number: 06-32

Appeal from the District Court of Teton County, the Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): William R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee (Defendant): John R. Goodell of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., Pocatello, Idaho.

Issues: Whether the lower court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Energy Electric Co., was proper. Whether the lower court’s Order Granting Energy Electric’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Energy Electric Co., was proper.

Holding: Rebecca Hatton (Rebecca) was injured in an automobile accident while she was traveling through road construction in the Snake River Canyon. She and her husband Asa, filed suit against the general contractor and various subcontractors on the job, including Energy Electric Co. (EEC), claiming the defendants were negligent in providing safety precautions in the construction area. The district court granted EEC’s summary judgment motion, ruling EEC did not owe a duty to the Hattons because it was not working in the area of the accident and had no control over the accident site.
Standard of Review: The Court evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the same materials as the district court. The party requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. The opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of material fact. They cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or the suggestion of a possibility or probability.
Does the Evidence in the Record Establish Any Issue of Material Fact?
The Hattons’ claims were grounded in negligence. The elements are (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant’s breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages. The determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law. Summary judgment is not favored in negligence actions. An absence of duty is the surest route to summary judgment in negligence actions. The legal question to be answered by the court is whether upon the facts in evidence such a relation exists between the parties that the community would impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other. In Allmaras v. Mudge the Court held that the general contractor has a non-delegable duty to provide for the safety of the driving public; however, no similar duty attached to a sub-contractor who did not exercise control over the general job and was not working on the job site at the time of the accident. EEC supported its summary judgment with a description of the location and timing of EEC’s work on the road construction project and relied on the official accident report to establish the date and location of the accident and stated that the company had not worked in the area of the accident at any time and was not working on the project at all when the accident occurred. The Hattons did not submit any information to counter the basic facts of the accident as set out in the affidavit or the accident report. The Hattons had a duty to provide the Court with a sufficient record on appeal to ensure proper consideration of their arguments. They did not include the transcript of the hearing but stated they referred to the documents at the summary judgment hearing. The Court could not rely on their assertions as to what the missing documents might have contained.
EEC claimed that they were not on the jobsite on the date of the accident. The Hattons did not refute that. The Hattons also presented a claim that the subcontract between EEC and LeGrand imposed a general duty upon EEC. The Court interprets contracts to determine the parties’ true intent. An unambiguous contract is interpreted as a matter of law and in accordance with the ordinary and usual meaning of its terms. Under the rationale of Allmaras, a subcontractor is not typically responsible for safety on the entire job site as long as it does not exercise control over the same. The records in the instant case fell short of creating some kind of general obligation for EEC to assume responsibility for safety for the entire project. Because the record does not include any evidence suggesting EEC was responsible for safety on the entire job site, or that it was working in the area of the accident, no issue of fact existed concerning whether EEC owed a duty to the Hattons. Summary judgment was proper.
Was the Summary Judgment Premature?
The Hattons cited Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC as support for their position that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to EEC because discovery had not been completed. However, the Hattons did not take the necessary steps to protect their discovery options. According to the record, the deposition of the key witness, Mr. Middleton, was scheduled but not completed and they did not request a continuance to allow them additional time to prepare. The Hattons did not establish the summary judgment hearing held in accordance with the district court’s scheduling order was premature or violated the rules of civil procedure or their due process rights.

Affirmed.

J. Kite delivered the decision.

Link to the case: http://tinyurl.com/sq482 .