Summary 2006 WY 156
Summary of Decision issued December 19, 2006
Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Case Name: Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp. v. Rohrman
Citation: 2006 WY 156
Docket Number: 05-290
W.R.A.P. 11 Certified Question from the
Representing Appellant (Defendant): Mikel L. Moore of Christensen, Moore, Cockrell, Cummings & Axelber, P.C., Kalispell, Montana; and James K. Lubing and Carter Wilkinson of Jackson, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): W. Keith Goody of Alpine,
The Certified Question: When faced with motions for summary judgment in which there are no genuine issues of material fact, how should a court differentiate as a matter of law, between “inherent risks” as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122(a)(i) and employed in § 1-1-123(a) and (b), and non-inherent risks in order to determine whether a recreational provider has a duty to eliminate, alter or control the risk at issue?
Statement of Alleged Facts Relevant to the Question Certified: From the federal district court: This case arises out of a ski injury that Plaintiff suffered on March 2, 2000 at Jackson Hole Mountain Resort (JHMR). Plaintiff is a resident of
Two days before this accident, another young man, Adam Harshman, died of injuries sustained after taking off from the other side of the same jump. Plaintiff alleges that JHMR had a duty to close the jump or warn of the dangers because they were not inherent risks of the sport. Defendant JHMR asserts that losing control on a table top jump is a risk inherent in skiing terrain parks and therefore, JHMR owed Plaintiff no duty.
Discussion: The Court referred to the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act § 1-1-122 and 1-1-123. Also, the Court referred to their recently decided case, Muller v. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort, which posed related issues. The general standard applied to the granting of a motion for summary judgment or a directed verdict in a negligence case is that only in the clearest of cases when the facts are undisputed and it is plain that all reasonable persons can draw but one inference from them, that the question is ever one of law for the court.
The Court stated they did not intend to equate “inherent risk” with “negligence”. If reasonable minds cannot differ as to whether or not a given set of factual circumstances involve an “inherent risk” of skiing, then the protections of the RSA apply and the litigation of that controversy must come to an end. The Court set out several statutory sources to assist in understanding what is intended by the phrase. They considered the definitions of “inherent risks of skiing” enacted by the legislators of states similarly situated to
The Court concluded that if the facts are such that they are undisputed, and it is plain that all reasonable persons can draw but one inference from them (in light of the definitions and case interpretations set out) then the trial court should either grant a properly filed motion for summary judgment or for directed verdict. However, if the facts do not reach that lofty bar, then the question is properly one for the jury to decide with the guidance of appropriate instructions, or for the trial court to decide if trial is to the court.
J. Burke special concurrence, joined by D. J. Kautz: J. Burke agreed with the primary conclusion reached by the majority capsulized in the third paragraph of the opinion. He stated his concerns regarding the majority’s conclusion that statutes defining “inherent risks of skiing” in
Also, in light of the Court’s holding in Muller, and that the
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